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The Europe 2020 strategy of the European Commission (EC) as well as the national reform and 
stability programmes attribute a central role to wage moderation policies. Real wage growth below 
productivity growth and policies to deregulate the labour market in order to achieve this are 
recommended to increase the international competitiveness of the EU. However, the track record 
of these policies in the last three decades has been poor growth performance along with a declining 
share of wages in national income and rising inequality.  Our results of a new project for the 
Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) show that the EC policy of wage moderation 
is counter-productive, and leads to a stagnation in growth, risk of deflation, and destabilizing 
growth models driven by debt or export surpluses in the absence of a healthy growth in wages.  
 
Our approach highlights the role of wages as a source of demand, and not only a cost item. Overall, 
a simultaneous decline in the wage share by 1 percentage point in all countries leads to a decline 
in the EU15 GDP by 0.30%.  The negative effect of the simultaneous race to the bottom on 
growth ranges between 0.07% in Ireland and 1.03% in Greece.   
 
We estimate the effects of a decline in the wage share on domestic consumption, private 
investment, domestic prices, export prices, exports, and imports in the EU15 countries. In all 
countries, consumption decreases, since workers consume more as a proportion of their income 
compared to those who earn profit income. Second, private investment is not very responsive to 
the increase in profits, but responds strongly to demand; when the wage share is decreased in all 
the EU15 countries, investment decreases in the majority of the countries (the UK, Germany, 
Spain, Greece, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Luxembourg). In countries such as Ireland, France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden the increase in investment due to higher profits remains 
insufficient to offset the negative effects on domestic consumption. Third, net exports (exports 
minus imports) increase due to a fall in unit labour costs, but again in the vast majority of countries, 
this increase is not enough to offset the negative effect on domestic demand.    
 
Our findings show that the EU15 as a whole is a wage-led economy; i.e. a fall in the wage share 
leads to lower growth. Large economies such as the UK, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain as well 
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as some small economies such as Greece, Portugal, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, and 
Luxemburg are wage-led. Four small economies, Ireland, Austria, Belgium and Denmark, are 
profit-led in isolation, i.e. they could grow along with a rise in the profit share, if they are the only 
countries doing this. However, it is misleading to analyse the EU Member States (MS) in isolation, 
since the same wage moderation policies have been implemented in all countries simultaneously. 
The EU is a rather closed economy with low extra-EU trade and high intra-EU trade; hence a fall 
in the wage share in Europe as a whole has only moderate positive effects on trade balances, but 
it has substantial negative effects on domestic demand.  When wages change simultaneously in all 
the EU15 countries, the export prices of each country relative to the other countries change little. 
“Beggar thy neighbour” policies through wage suppression in the EU15 lead to strong negative 
effects on domestic demand, which cannot be offset by the international competitiveness effects. 
Hence not only the wage-led countries but also the profit-led countries such as Ireland and Austria 
contract as an outcome of wage restraint policies.  Greece, albeit a small open economy, is affected 
most strongly as a combination of four factors: domestic consumption falls strongly; private 
investment does not respond to higher profits; exports are not very sensitive to labour costs; and 
imports do not react to the fall in labour costs at all. 
 
These results are in striking contrast to the expectations of neoclassical economics, which forms 
the theoretical basis of the wage restraint policies of the EC, which assumes that all our economies 
and Europe as a whole is profit-led. This is empirically not true. 
 
In a wage-led economy like the EU as a whole, more egalitarian policies are consistent with 
growth. In Table 1, we suggest a wage-led recovery scenario, where all EU15 countries increase 
their wage share during 2016-2020, albeit at differentiated rates, with a 5%-point cumulative 
increase in the wage-led countries in the next five years, a 3%-point increase in the intermediate 
group of Ireland and Austria, which become wage-led when there is a simultaneous change in 
wages, and a 1%-point increase in Belgium and Denmark, which remain profit-led also in the race 
to the bottom scenario. In this scenario, all individual EU15 countries can grow along with an 
improvement in equality, and the overall EU15 GDP would be 1.51% higher in 2020. 
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Table 1:  The effects of a wage-led recovery scenario on growth 
Increase in the wage share % change in GDP
A 3 1.15
B 1 0.27
DK 1 0.44
FIN 5 1.49
F 5 1.12
D 5 2.2
GR 5 5.12
IRL 3 0.33
I 5 1.18
L 5 0.64
NL 5 0.95
P 5 2.38
E 5 2.71
S 5 1.28
UK 5 0.96
EU 15 GDP* 1.51  
 
Notes: A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = 
Ireland, I = Italy, L = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
* EU15 GDP is calculated by multiplying country specific growth rates with the weighted share of each country in 
EU15 GDP.  
 
 
This wage-led recovery scenario will lead to only a modest 1.2 percentage point increase in 
inflation in the EU15. In light of a risk of deflation in the Eurozone our findings indicate that a 
wage stimulus in the EU15 would help the ECB approach its inflation target. This alternative 
scenario would be consistent with an annual nominal wage increase of 3.1% in the EU15 on 
average (assuming a 0.7% annual increase in labour productivity).  
 
- A COORDINATED WAGE-LED RECOVERY POLICY CAN LEAD TO 1.51% HIGHER 
GDP IN THE EU15 IN 2020  
 
- TO DEFEAT DEFLATION EUROPE NEEDS A PAY RISE: THE WAGE-LED 
RECOVERY LEADS TO 1.2 PERCENTAGE POINT INCREASE IN INFLATION  
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Wage policy coordination among the EU Member States (MS) can improve macroeconomic 
performance as well as avoid reliance on unsustainable growth models driven by debt or export 
surpluses to substitute deficient domestic demand. While pro-labour policies can also be 
implemented in a single country in particular in the wage-led economies, the impact of these 
policies is stronger when they are coordinated, and provide opportunities to avoid reliance on wage 
competition in even small economies such as Ireland or Austria. Indeed, Ireland and Austria cannot 
grow along with a decline in the wage share, when wage moderation policies are implemented in 
all the EU MS.  
 
However, the effects that can come from a wage-led recovery on growth and hence employment 
are modest, albeit positive, in magnitude; hence it is crucial that policies for wage-led development 
are complemented by a broad mix of economic policies, in particular public investment in social 
and physical infrastructure. The impact of wage increases on trade imbalances across countries 
require further targeted investment and industrial policy at the European level.   
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